[Download] "Beverly Hospital v. Early" by Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts * Book PDF Kindle ePub Free
eBook details
- Title: Beverly Hospital v. Early
- Author : Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
- Release Date : January 25, 1935
- Genre: Law,Books,Professional & Technical,
- Pages : * pages
- Size : 65 KB
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LUMMUS, Justice. This is an action of contract on an account annexed to recover for board, room and attendance furnished the defendant's late wife, for which he undertook in writing to pay. The plaintiff is a charitable corporation, and is none the less such because it charges those who are able to pay. McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432, 435, 21 Am. Rep. 529; Thornton v. Franklin Square House, 200 Mass. 465, 467, 86 N.E. 909, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 486; New England Sanitarium v. Inhabitants of Stoneham, 205 Mass. 335, 342, 91 N.E. 385; Little v. City of Newburyport, 210 Mass. 414, 418, 96 N.E. 1032, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 425; Newton Centre Woman's Club, Inc., v. City of Newton, 258 Mass. 326, 154 N.E. 846; Springfield Young Men's Christian Association v. Board of Assessors of City of Springfield, 284 Mass. 1, 187 N.E. 104; Powers v. Massachusetts Homoeopathic Hospital (C. C. A.) 109 F. 294, 65 L. R. A. 372. The answer, so far as material, was a general denial and an allegation that the negligence of servants of the plaintiff caused the patient's leg to be burned, so that it had to be amputated, wherefore 'the character and quality of the services rendered by the plaintiff were not such as to justify the charge * * * but * * * were worthless.' The defendant conceded that the amount charged would have been reasonable had there been no negligence. The Judge, upon the opening for the defendant, ruled 'that as a matter of law this defense was not open on the pleadings and on the law,' and ordered a verdict for the plaintiff in the full amount of the declaration. The defendant excepted. The plaintiff contends that the defense outlined was by way of recoupment; that recoupment is available only where a cross action would lie (Graham v. Middleby, 213 Mass. 437, 443, 100 N.E. 750, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 977, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 384; McCarthy v. Henderson, 138 Mass. 310, 313; Bucholz v. Green Bros. Co. [Mass.] 195 N.E. 318); and that no cross action could have been brought in this case by the defendant or his wife against a charitable corporation like the plaintiff, either in tort (Kidd v. Massachusetts Homeopathic Hospital, 237 Mass. 500, 130 N.E. 55, and cases cited), or in contract upon an undertaking to use reasonable skill and care (Roosen v. Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, 253 Mass. 66, 75, 126 N.E. 392, 14 A. L. R. 563). The main ground of the immunity of such a charity is that the charitable funds ought not to be diverted to the payment of damages. Foley v. Wesson Memorial Hospital, 246 Mass. 363, 141 N.E. 113; Glaser v. Congregation Kehillath Israel, 263 Mass. 435, 161 N.E. 619; Reavey v. Guild of St. Agnes, 284 Mass. 300, 187 N.E. 557. Compare McKay v. Morgan Memorial Co-operative Industries & Stores, Inc., 272 Mass. 121, 124, 172 N.E. 68. We need not consider in this case whether this immunity extends to furnishing inferior and negligent service in violation of a contract, when set up merely in recoupment (see Moses v. Stevens, 2 Pick. 332, 336, 337; Moulton v. Trask, 9 Metc. 577, 579; Austin v. Foster, 9 Pick. 341; 59 C. J. 319, § 476), for we are of opinion that what the defendant sought in this case was not recoupment at all.